Last week, Hoff pointed to a presentation by Mark Masterson on cloud security. Given Hoff's level of enthusiasm, I was underwhelmed by the content, but sometimes that can happen.
An excerpt:
My takeaways from Masterson's deck were:
- You can't use the risk formula to "prove" that a complex system is "secure."
- Cloud computing increases complexity, so you can't use it (the formula) or prove it even more.
- Somehow, this proves that people that support "defense in depth" are wrong.
- You are better off "finding ways to design systems that cope gracefully with uncertainty." (This, of course, is also unprovable.)
- We need to stop thinking in terms of "security" and start thinking in terms of "health."
- The Cloud will be just as "safe" as "healthy" as you already are.
To be honest, I think there are HUGE holes in Masterson's logic (I still can't decide whether the first part was intended to be logical or simply analogous). That said, I agree with a lot of what he is saying, which boils down to a call for de-perimeterization and component-based security supported by autonomic computing.
I suppose my biggest criticism is that Masterson talks about "healthy" as if everyone agrees on what's healthy (and, analogously, what is "safe"). I don't trust/believe this by a long shot. Take, for example, this snippet from a recent NY Times article on health:
(This little snippet was my original inspiration for writing this post, though it sort of went in a different direction.)
Ultimately, I think people are much better off using the risk formula as a model to consider how things will change in their cloud environment – exposure to more users (sources of threats), potential for more components (attack surface), and effect on the consequences.