There was a recent report in the New York Times on how FBI wiretaps can be bypassed by emitting an "idle signal" on the line. Now, there is no denying that this is interesting research, and of course the New York Times picked up on the "cool" factor, but I have a simple question. Just for a second, focus only on the risk that a wiretap will be bypassed. Do you think that risk is now higher or lower than it was before the paper was written or the information was made publicly available, and why?
While I already posted my own opinion about this paper, I didn’t answer that question exactly.
I’d say the risk is the same in your case because if a wiretap target believes their line is bugged, they will avoid the wiretap risk, not mitigate it by exploiting vulnerabilities in the wiretap system.
@Chandler -
A good point, but what about the case where the target doesn’t believe the line is bugged, but it actually is (presumably the case with ALL successful wiretaps)? Since it is a simple protection mechanism for targets, there is no reason not to send the signal during all conversations.
If you want to start tap-blocking every phone call you send or receive, then you’re by definition increasing the expected rate of occurrence of a wiretap being blocked. Since the number of wiretaps is greater than zero, any blocking increases the risk of a tap being blocked by definition.
The more interesting question is, “What is the increase in the risk that information relevant to the warrant which granted the wiretap will now be missed?” This requires a lot more data and assumpions than I’m going to get into at this time.
Also, I still want to know why, if the target doesn’t believe their line might be bugged, we would expect them to be mitigating the risk?
From a pure Risk Management perspective, implementing a countermeasure if you don’t believe there is a threat is irrational behavior since the assessed risk would be zero.