Thresholds and Scale of Identity Fraud

A new study from ID Analytics provides evidence that you are better off being a victim of a large data breach (e.g. VA 26 millon records) than a small one (your alma mater):

Smaller breaches had a higher misuse rate than larger breaches. Misuse
of personal data ranged from one in 200 identities for breaches of
fewer than 5,000 individuals to a misuse rate of less than one in
10,000 identities for breaches of more than 100,000 individuals.

This is an assertion I made after the VA breach:

If this is true, then it is best for each individual involved to be one
of many; the larger the number of SSNs stolen, the less likely any
individual is to be a victim. So 26.5 million is better than, say, 5
and 300 million would be better still. (Obviously, the best case would
be to not be in this group at all).

(more of my commentary on the VA incident.)

2 comments for “Thresholds and Scale of Identity Fraud

  1. November 9, 2007 at 11:37 am

    This is pretty much the textbook case of “misery loves company.”

    If a million people get their data stolen, someone is going to do something about it without you needing to do something.

    If a hundred people get their data stolen, it’s probably up to you.

  2. Pete
    November 9, 2007 at 11:51 am

    @Dan -

    If your point is that the extra attention placed on huge breaches ends up reducing the risk to any individual, it is certainly an interesting one. I think that was something Chris Walsh brought up during the VA breach discussion, and I’ve discussed it as well.

    I am a bit skeptical, however, that we can really do anything in the recovery/response phase of a breach that would lead to the 25x improvement suggested by the difference. I think it is simply due to the abundance of records available.

    The other thing that got brought up was the length of time that someone has to compromise the IDs…

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